Why the war came to the Owen Stanley Range, and how a small, under-equipped militia and the tired men of the AIF held a jungle track against the odds.
Knowing why the fighting happened, and what each side was thinking, brings the Track to life. A battle without context is just a place on a map. Here is the short version.
Australia unprepared. After the Great War, economic good times and a wave of pacifism led to disarmament, and the Great Depression then left governments unable to rebuild their forces. Australia put its faith in British naval power and Fortress Singapore. When war came in 1939, the government avoided conscription for overseas service by creating two armies: the volunteer AIF, sent abroad, and the part-time Militia for home defence. Most of the experienced AIF divisions were in the Middle East.
Japan expanding. By the late 1930s Japan was deep in a war in China and short of the oil and metals it needed. When the United States imposed a trade embargo, Japan chose to expand across South-East Asia, attacking Pearl Harbor in December 1941.
The tide in the Pacific. Within weeks Japan had taken Rabaul, bombed Port Moresby, captured Singapore (15 February 1942) and invaded Java. The 30th Brigade's militia battalions (the 39th, 49th and 53rd) went to Port Moresby largely to delay an attack. Then the Battle of the Coral Sea (6-9 May) turned back a Japanese invasion fleet bound for Port Moresby, and the victory at Midway (4-6 June) showed Japan could be beaten. PNG became the front line.
Why Port Moresby? Taking it would protect Japan's flank and its oil, tin and rubber in the Dutch East Indies, deny the Allies a base to strike Rabaul, give Japan a base to bomb northern Australia, and close the Torres Strait and Timor Sea to Allied shipping. With the sea route turned back, the Japanese decided to go overland, from the northern beaches over the Owen Stanley Range.
A handful of militia, a Papuan infantry battalion and the carriers who kept them alive were pushed steadily back up the Track, trading ground for time until they could be reinforced.
The 39th Battalion (a Militia unit from Victoria) and the Papuan Infantry Battalion are formed into Maroubra Force, tasked with protecting the Kokoda airstrip and delaying any advance from the northern beaches towards Port Moresby. They begin the march along the Track.
Captain Sam Templeton's B Company arrives, exhausted after seven days on the Track. They set up defensive positions and spend a week training and patrolling around the plateau.
An invasion force from Rabaul arrives off the north coast and lands unopposed. Nine hundred infantry are ashore by the next dawn, with more to follow. Australian observers slip away to report the landing.
Papuan Infantry Battalion troops under Major William Watson meet the Japanese, are forced back, and cross the Kumusi River, destroying the footbridge behind them. Reinforced by a platoon of the 39th, they are driven back again.
At Oivi, Captain Templeton disappears and is never seen again. Lance Corporal Sanopa of the Papuan Infantry Battalion leads troops through the Japanese lines along a creek to Deniki. Lieutenant Colonel William Owen retakes Kokoda and calls for reinforcements, but the airstrip is lost when planes refuse to land. At 2 am on 29 July the Japanese attack through fog and Owen is shot dead. The Australians fall back to Deniki.

Major Allan Cameron sends three companies out from Deniki to retake Kokoda. They are poorly informed about a much larger Japanese force. A Company reaches Kokoda unopposed, but with the other companies pinned down, the plateau is abandoned by 10 August and the 39th returns to Deniki in disarray.
From the high ground at Deniki, which overlooks Kokoda and the Yodda Valley, Maroubra Force watches the Japanese prepare. The attacks begin on 12 August and by the 13th the depleted units pull back to Isurava. On 16 August Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Honner, a schoolmaster turned lawyer and a veteran of Libya, Greece and Crete, takes command with orders to hold north of the ranges until the 21st Brigade arrives.

About 2,500 Japanese attack some 400 militia from the 39th, with elements of the 49th and 53rd. The AIF's 2/14th Battalion arrives to relieve them and fights alongside, with the 2/16th brought up to plug a gap. Over four violent days, outnumbered Australians are slowly squeezed. Private Bruce Kingsbury of the 2/14th charges with a Bren gun from the hip and is killed; he is awarded the Victoria Cross. The force withdraws, and the 39th and 53rd are sent back to rest.

The Australians dig in south of the fast-flowing creek, but the Japanese cross after dark and threaten to outflank them, so they fall back again at dawn.

Brigadier Arnold Potts' brigade is worn out after a week of constant fighting without a hot meal, their feet pulpy from the constant wet. He decides no position can be held without heavy reinforcement, and the withdrawal continues down the Track.

Lieutenant Herbert Kienzle had found the dry lake beds of Myola in early August and turned them into a supply depot for air drops. The exhausted brigade gets a hot meal and clean clothes there, then the stores are destroyed or removed and the Australians leave through the mud and rain towards Kagi and Efogi.

At Menari, Honner thanks the ragged remnants of the 39th, whose strength has fallen from 470 to 180 in five weeks, leaning on sticks instead of rifles. Cinematographer Damien Parer films them as they are, "ragged bloody heroes", in one of the most enduring images of the campaign.
At Kagi the three AIF battalions of the 21st Brigade finally fight together. The fresh 2/27th is posted forward on Mission Ridge, and the 2/14th and 2/16th take the high ground at Brigade Hill. After dark the Japanese come down the valley, lit by smouldering lengths of captured signal wire.
While the Japanese pin the front, a battalion circles through the jungle and cuts the Track behind the Australians, between the infantry and brigade headquarters. Counter-attacks by Captains Claude Nye and Brenton Langridge, with bayonets fixed, fail against dug-in positions and both officers die. By nightfall headquarters withdraws to Menari. 62 Australians lost their lives.

With communications lost, Lieutenant Colonel Caro takes command north of the Japanese and leaves the Track. The 2/14th and 2/16th cut a roundabout route through the jungle carrying their wounded, and the 2/27th follows with fifteen stretcher cases, rejoining the Australian lines at Menari and beyond.
The Australians fall back over the Maguli Range to Ioribaiwa Ridge, two ridges from the end of the Owen Stanley Range, where the fresh 25th Brigade under Brigadier Ken Eather takes over, with Vickers machine guns and mortars. The depleted 21st Brigade fights on as a composite force.

Eather asks to pull back to Imita Ridge, where artillery can reach the Japanese and supply lines are short. He is told it is the last stand. That night the Japanese on Ioribaiwa see what they believe are the lights of Port Moresby. They have outrun their supplies and are hungry, sick and exhausted.

Hungry, sick and at the end of a very long supply line, the Japanese were ordered back. Now the Australians pursued them up the Track they had just given up.
General Horii receives orders to stop attacking Port Moresby, then to withdraw, and the order is confirmed from Tokyo. Horii is furious, but the South Seas Force "advances to the rear" in good order. The Japanese Army had no plan for retreat. The attack on Imita Ridge never comes.
The 25th Brigade moves forward from Imita Ridge and finds Ioribaiwa abandoned. The pursuit is slow and cautious, expecting an ambush at every bend. There is little contact for two weeks.
Horii raises the 600-strong Stanley Detachment to block the pursuit, and it ambushes and delays the Australians near Mt Bellamy while the main force prepares positions at Templeton's Crossing.
With the fresh 16th Brigade alongside the 25th, more than three thousand Australians attack from 17 October. Using the same flanking tactics the Japanese had used so well, they drive the Japanese back, and a frontal attack on 20 October sweeps the position.
The Japanese rush reinforcements to a position high above the creek. The first Australian attacks fail at great cost, but the position falls, and the Japanese retreat in a dysfunctional state.

The 2/31st Battalion walks into Kokoda unopposed on 2 November; the Japanese had left two days earlier. By now "Kokoda" is a household word in Australia. On the 3rd, Major General Vasey lands at the airstrip for two ceremonies, one at the flagpole and one honouring the Papuan carriers and soldiers. The war in Papua continues down to the beaches, ending around Gona and Buna in mid-January 1943.
Many wartime remains survive: weapon pits, ammunition dumps, shell cases, rifles and personal items, some still in the places they were left, and others in the small village museums at Kokoda and Alola. Your guide will tell you what to look at, and what not to touch. Please never remove or move anything.
For the details of the key sites along the Track, see The Track.
A good book or two before the trek will transform what you see. These are favourites from our guides and trekkers, and all are worth borrowing from a library. The No Roads Expeditions website also has a series on the Kokoda battlegrounds written by Major Andrew Flanagan of the ADF: read the series.